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agent-janitor

Process hygiene for agent machines — finds the background processes your agent left behind (dev servers, tunnels, watchers, nohup jobs) using evidence signals (ppid=1 reparent, port listener via /proc/net/tcp{,6}, dev-server traits, TTL exceeded) and attributes them to the originating tool call via agent-ledger's ledger when present. Dry-run by default: nothing is killed until you write policy_mode=enforce; system daemons and host/VM management agents are exempt by name, a user-editable whitelist covers your real infrastructure, and each kill re-reads the cmdline first (SIGTERM, 2s, SIGKILL with PID-reuse check). stdlib-only, fails open. Disclosure — inside Hermes it only appends terminal commands that look like they start background work (first 300 characters, which can include inline secrets) to plugin-data/agent-janitor/spawns.jsonl, and reads agent-ledger's ledger.db read-only when present. Killing is a separate CLI you run yourself (janitor_cli.py sweep): after you write "enforce" to plugin-data/agent-janitor/policy_mode it sends SIGTERM then SIGKILL to every process re-parented to PID 1 for over a minute that is not on its built-in exempt list or your whitelist, whoever started it (for example a tmux server or a nohup'd hermes gateway), including other users' processes when run as root. Dry-run first; the dry-run list is the kill list.

ZidoCode3Toolsv0.3.1Updated 25 days ago

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Process hygiene for agent machines — finds the background processes your agent left behind (dev servers, tunnels, watchers, nohup jobs) using evidence signals (ppid=1 reparent, port listener via /proc/net/tcp{,6}, dev-server traits, TTL exceeded) and attributes them to the originating tool call via agent-ledger's ledger when present. Dry-run by default: nothing is killed until you write policy_mode=enforce; system daemons and host/VM management agents are exempt by name, a user-editable whitelist covers your real infrastructure, and each kill re-reads the cmdline first (SIGTERM, 2s, SIGKILL with PID-reuse check). stdlib-only, fails open. Disclosure — inside Hermes it only appends terminal commands that look like they start background work (first 300 characters, which can include inline secrets) to plugin-data/agent-janitor/spawns.jsonl, and reads agent-ledger's ledger.db read-only when present. Killing is a separate CLI you run yourself (janitor_cli.py sweep): after you write "enforce" to plugin-data/agent-janitor/policy_mode it sends SIGTERM then SIGKILL to every process re-parented to PID 1 for over a minute that is not on its built-in exempt list or your whitelist, whoever started it (for example a tmux server or a nohup'd hermes gateway), including other users' processes when run as root. Dry-run first; the dry-run list is the kill list.

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More by ZidoCode

4 plugins by ZidoCode in the catalog.

ZidoCodeagent-ledgerWrite-ahead ledger for agent side effects, with an OWASP Agentic Top 10 posture scorer. Disclosure — records the arguments (up to 4000 chars: terminal commands, file contents, MCP args) and a 300-char result digest of every state-changing tool call in a local plaintext SQLite ledger under HERMES_HOME/plugin-data/agent-ledger/ that is never pruned; injects a warning listing this session's unconfirmed calls into the next turn's context; an optional policy engine (off by default; you add policy.json and set policy_mode) can refuse matching tool calls before they run; the optional posture_daily.py script, run from your own cron, sends a score summary to Telegram with the bot token you give it.Communitytools2ZidoCodecontext-auditContext-window forensics: per-turn input/output token estimates, the single largest tool output of each turn, oversized tool calls (args over 50 KB), and compaction events, recorded as metadata only (tool name, byte length, ids, timestamps — never args or results) in a local SQLite DB under HERMES_HOME/plugin-data/context-audit/. Adds a /context-audit slash command that prints the top 5 context eaters over a window with one mitigation per entry.Communitytools2ZidoCodeskill-integrityRug-pull detection for installed agent skills — fingerprints every file in every skill directory (SHA-256), keeps a profile-local snapshot, and reports exactly which skill files changed, appeared, or vanished since; a skill that mutates after install without the user touching it is the rug-pull signal. A skill directory made unreadable is reported as a finding, never treated as clean. Read-only observer, stdlib-only, zero network calls; blind spots (oversize files, symlinks, permission-denied) are counted and printed, never silent. The wrapper registers an hourly pre_llm_call hook that injects findings into the agent context, plus a /skill-integrity slash command (snapshot | check | show) that creates the baseline snapshot and shows the file-level diff. The CLI supports --state-dir to target the plugin's manifest directly. Skill dirs and state derive from get_hermes_home(), covering non-default profiles. Disclosure — reads (hash-only, read-only) every file under the active profile's skills directory and ~/.claude/skills, stores a mode-0600 snapshot in HERMES_HOME/plugin-data/skill-integrity, and at most hourly injects the names of changed skills into the agent's context.Communitytools1