otsoa-dubief

Guardrails that follow what a conversation has read. Once a session reads untrusted content (a web page, a browser snapshot, an MCP or third-party plugin's output, a customer's message), airlock seals it: messages to anyone but the owner, network writes, pushes and deploys, memory, skill and cron writes, browser input, URLs that could carry data out and code that reaches the network go through Hermes's own approval gate. Walls hold in every session: credential paths and secret files, the guard's own files and Hermes's config, shell startup files, other profiles, commands that switch approvals off. Shell commands are read the way the shell reads them, so a command that computes or hides what it runs (eval, base64 | sh, $G push, wildcards, write-then-run) is refused until written in clear. Subagents inherit the seal. It also catches an injection by its signature: recognized secrets never leave in a call; a private marker in the agent's context locks the session if it shows up in a tool call; a send to an address the untrusted content named is blocked; repeated refusals lock the session; lookalike Unicode in commands is refused. Plugin and MCP tools nobody admitted need approval. Observe mode, stop switch, `hermes airlock check|demo|log`. Tested on a corpus of 251 attacks and everyday commands, and end to end in the official image.